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 Abstract: This chapter aims to reconstruct the phenomenological theories on hatred 
developed by Scheler, Pfänder and Kolnai and to refl ect upon its anthropological 
implications. Four essential aspects of this phenomenon are analyzed, taking as point 
of departure the works of these authors: (1) its place in the taxonomy of the affective 
life; (2) the world of its objects; (3) its expression in the form of bodily manifestations 
and motivating force; and (4) the inherent possibilities for overcoming it. The chapter 
concludes that hatred is a key phenomenon for understanding aspects of human 
nature that we generally try to ignore or overlook. 
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 Introduction: hatred and its place at the core of human nature 
 In recent years, scholars working in phenomenology as well as in philosophy of 
mind have progressively acknowledged the philosophical importance of the work 
realized by Husserl’s fi rst students – the “early phenomenologists” – on the affective 
domain. Under Husserl’s infl uence, a very heterogeneous group of thinkers devel-
oped accurate and inspiring accounts of the affective life. 1 Authors belonging to this 
group include Alexander Pfänder, Else Voigtländer, Willy Haas, Moritz Geiger, Max 
Scheler, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Edith Stein, and Gerda Walther, to mention but a 
few. Even though the phenomenology of affectivity developed within this movement 
cannot be considered unitary, it is possible to identify some traits shared by all of 
these authors. These include a similar methodological orientation and a common 
interest in topics such as the embodied dimension of the emotions, their relation 
to perception, imagination, and judgment, or their cognitive capacity to grasp val-
ues. Also common to all is the anthropological postulate that love is a constitutive 
element of the human being. 2 Early phenomenologists were convinced that we are 
determined to love, i.e., to be open to the world and to establish positive bonds 
with ourselves and others. Some of these “philosophers of love,” however, were also 
attracted to the study of hatred. 3 Max Scheler, Alexander Pfänder, and Aurel Kolnai 
in particular devoted space to this phenomenon. Despite the privileged place of love 
as an elemental force of human nature, the interpersonal nexus with others may 
take a negative form and hatred may overwhelm individuals and social collectives. 
This chapter aims to reconstruct early phenomenological theories on this powerful 
affective phenomenon, to illuminate its structure and to refl ect upon its anthropo-
logical implications. 
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 From the perspective of current philosophy of the emotions, there are at least two 
reasons for an analysis of hatred. First, against the widespread belief that hatred is the 
mere opposite of love, it is necessary to offer an approach to this phenomenon that 
considers it on its own. The nature of hatred cannot be fully explained if we conceive 
it to be just the emotional counterpart of love. Surely love and hatred are entangled in 
multiple ways, but they are – as the phenomenological view will reveal – not symmetri-
cal opposites. Love and other pro-attitudes that dominate the interpersonal dimension 
of our experience are so variegated and richly nuanced that we do not possess proper 
names for each of them. We can love our country, our partner, our friends, and our 
pets: in all these case we speak about love, despite the strong qualitative differences 
and the varieties of objects. On the contrary, negative modes of existence are more 
punctual, less nuanced, and their objects more clearly circumscribed. These differ-
ences are refl ected in the fact that we possess more names for negative emotions than 
positive ones. 4 Second, it has been common in the political, moral, psychological, and 
philosophical spheres to banish hatred from discourse or to reduce it to other negative 
but more politically correct emotions such as envy, contempt, or resentment. 5 Against 
this tendency to vanquish hatred, however, it is necessary to incorporate hatred into 
current discussions and to accept its role as a strong motivational force that shapes 
our lives. In current debates on the philosophy of the emotions, a fully developed 
analysis that takes hatred as a more confi ned phenomenon than love and considers it 
in its individual and collective forms is missing, though it would illuminate the human 
experience from new angles. 
 Two important considerations guide the choice to focus on analyses offered by the 
early phenomenologists on this phenomenon. 6 Both have to do with the  perspectival 
richness of the phenomenological approaches. First, given its  complex and multilay-
ered nature , hatred is not easy to classify and seems to escape the boundaries of our 
current taxonomy of the affective realm. Is hatred a passion, an emotion, a sentiment, 
or an attitude? 7 This question is not easy to elucidate, and the three phenomenolog-
ical approaches to hatred differ considerably in their answers. Scheler conceives of 
hatred as an emotional act-experience, Pfänder takes it to be a paradigmatic case of 
sentiment, and Kolnai sees it as an emotive response. These differences are, on the one 
hand, an immediate result of the multifaceted structure of hatred and, on the other, 
a consequence of the freedom to apply the phenomenological attitude to its object of 
study in various ways. Behind these differences there is a common attempt to go back 
to the thing itself, to liberate the phenomenon from theoretical constructs and take as 
a point of departure only what is given in the experience. Thus, these three phenom-
enologists illuminate hatred from different angles, shedding light on different sides of 
human experience. Rather than competing with one another, they are complementary 
accounts that explain the richness of this phenomenon. Considered together, they offer 
a multi-perspectival view on hatred. 
 Second, the early phenomenological analyses have the virtue of understanding 
hatred in its  dynamic unity with other hostile passions, emotions, sentiments, and 
attitudes . Early phenomenologists were aware that understanding hatred implies an 
explanation of how this affective phenomenon relates to other aversive states. In this 
regard, Scheler offers an analysis of the link between hatred and envy, revenge, and 
ressentiment; Pfänder claims that hatred shares a common essence with malevolence 
and hostility; and Kolnai claims that hatred, together with disgust and fear, is a stan-
dard mode of aversion. 
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 Which is the anthropological signifi cance of hatred? What does it reveal about 
us? The reconstruction and study of early phenomenological accounts is crucial for 
answering the central question of this chapter regarding hatred’s place in the very core 
of human nature. A reasoned answer to this question presupposes an analysis of four 
essential aspects of hatred: (1) its place in the taxonomy of the affective life; (2) the 
world of its objects; (3) its expression in the form of bodily manifestations and moti-
vating force; and (4) the inherent possibilities for overcoming it. These four aspects are 
interrelated in multiple ways, and they can be elucidated by investigating the specifi c 
ways in which hatred is directed towards the world, others, and ourselves, i.e., inves-
tigating its original “affective intentionality.” In the next three sections, I will present 
the differential analysis of these four aspects in the approaches of Scheler, Pfänder, and 
Kolnai, consecutively. In the concluding remarks, I will focus on the heuristic value of 
this phenomenon, according to which hatred is a key phenomenon for understanding 
aspects of human nature that we generally try to ignore or overlook. By the end of this 
chapter, I hope to have shown that attempts to patiently understand this phenomenon 
in earlier periods of the phenomenological tradition are not only worthy from an his-
torical point of view but also shed light on an unpleasant but undeniable aspect of our 
human reality. 
 §1. Max Scheler: hatred as a movement of the heart 
 §1.1. Emotional act-experience: hatred’s depth and its blinding force 
 Max Scheler approached the issue of hatred in his main works –  Formalism in Ethics 
(1913/1916) and  The Nature of Sympathy (1913/1923) – as well as in minor essays, 
such as his essay on “Ressentiment” (1912), in his posthumous “Ordo Amoris” 
(1914–1916), and his published conference on the origins of hatred against Germans 
(1917). Focusing on the notion of the intentionality of hatred, in these works we fi nd 
points on all four aspects mentioned above. 
 I shall start with the fi rst question, regarding the place of hatred in Scheler’s taxon-
omy. One of Scheler’s most illuminating discoveries concerns the thesis of the stratifi -
cation of the emotional life. 8 Given that not all affective phenomena are of the same 
kind, it is possible to establish a taxonomy of the affective realm. In  Formalism in 
Ethics , a central distinction is traced between “feeling states,” such as moods and sen-
sations (pleasure and pain) that are not intentional, on the one hand, and “intentional 
feelings,” which are essentially related to their objects, on the other. Scheler regards 
intentional feelings as a kind of “organ” for comprehending values, and he speaks 
of an “ original emotive intentionality,” underscoring that the intentional “feeling of 
something” is responsible for grasping values. 9 
 Intentional feelings can be divided in two main kinds: the “intentional functions of 
feelings” and “emotional act-experiences.” “Intentional functions of feelings” can be 
of three different classes: (a) the feeling of feeling-states, such as when we feel pain; 
(b) the feeling of objective emotional characteristics of the atmosphere, such as when 
we feel the sadness of a landscape; (c) the feeling of values, which has the cognitive 
function of grasping values such as the agreeable or the beautiful. 
 “Emotional act-experiences” constitute a higher stage in our emotional and inten-
tional life. Act-experiences can be divided in two classes: (a) acts of preferring and 
placing after, which are responsible for the apprehension of a hierarchy of values; and 
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(b) love and hate, which are not responses to values or their rank, but spontaneous 
acts responsible for discovering values. 10 In this sense, Scheler writes in  Formalism in 
Ethics , 
 In love and hate our spirit does much more than ‘respond’ to already felt and per-
haps preferred values. Love and hate are acts in which the value-realm accessible 
to the feeling of a being [. . .] is either  extended or  narrowed . 11 
 The principal idea behind this description is that in love we are open to new values, 
while in hatred we not only remain closed to them but are in search of values of a 
lower rank. That is, love and hatred are movements of the heart towards higher and 
lower values, respectively. 
 In the case that we respond to the grasped value, we have a feeling. According to the 
level of depth of the grasped value, four main kinds of feelings may be distinguished: 
sense-feelings, vital feelings, psychological feelings, and feelings of personality. The 
last two classes include those feelings that, in contemporary vocabulary, we call “emo-
tions.” Only after an intentional function of feeling or an intentional emotive act 
discovers and grasps a value and its hierarchical position can an emotional response 
arise. 12 
 In a similar vein, in  The Nature of Sympathy Scheler defends the claim that love and 
hatred are intentional act-experiences. This text was fi rst published in 1913 as  Zur 
Phänomenologie der Sympahtiegefühle und von Liebe und Hass , and a revised and 
extended version appeared 1923 under the title  Wesen und Formen der Sympathie . As 
he claims in this book, Scheler takes the idea that love and hate are “emotional acts” 
from Brentano. It is well known that Brentano distinguished three main mental acts 
according to their intentional directedness: presentations, judgments, and love and 
hatred. This last class includes all affective and conative phenomena, such as emo-
tions, feelings, acts of the will, and desires, and it is rooted in presentations. 13 Despite 
taking Brentano as a point of departure, Scheler modifi es his claims in three respects. 
First, Scheler’s view on the class of love and hate is more nuanced than Brentano’s, 
since Scheler differentiates conative acts (such as preferring or willing) from affective 
ones (such as love and hate, but also joy, sadness, etc.). 
 Second, against Brentano Scheler rejects employing the expression “love and hate” 
to refer to all affective phenomena, reserving it for just one type of them. In this 
regard, he distinguishes different kinds of affective phenomena: feeling states, inten-
tional functions of feelings, emotional responses, acts of preference, and love and hate 
in a proper sense. Thus, according to Scheler, love and hate have their own nature. 
Love and hate cannot be classifi ed as intentional functions of feeling because it is pos-
sible to feel a positive value in an object and not love it and to feel a negative value 
and not hate it. In love we can feel the values of the things we love, their elegance or 
their beauty, but we can also feel these values without loving. In the same sense, we 
can also feel disvalue without hating things. Love and hate are not responses to values, 
since we can love someone who causes us pain and hate someone or something that 
gives us pleasure and joy. 14 Love and hate are not acts of preference because they do 
not depend on the values given by the object or their rank. 
 Finally, while Brentano thinks the phenomena of love and hate are founded in cog-
nitive acts (presentations), Scheler thinks they are founding for all cognitive, cona-
tive, and other affective phenomena. 15 Our attitude of being open or closed to the 
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world determines what we can perceive or judge about it. A similar claim is defended 
in “Ordo Amoris”: “Man, before he is an  ens cogitans or an  ens volens , is an  ens 
amans .” 16 They are also founding for all acts of preference, all functions of feeling, and 
all emotional responses. The preference for a value is founded in love in the sense that 
love shows the higher value that is preferred. 
 The idea that love and hate are act-experiences, thus, should be understood in the 
following sense. Love does not create the discovered values but makes it possible for 
these values to appear, and it is the intention for the realization of higher values in its 
object. Hatred destroys higher values and blinkers acts of preference and functions of 
feeling. 17 Love and hate are movements or intentions for the realization of higher and 
lower values in their objects, respectively. 18 
 Taking this classifi cation of the affective realm as a point of departure, it is possi-
ble to attempt an answer to the question about the place of hatred in the core of the 
human heart. Hatred is not a sensation, a response to a felt value, an intentional func-
tion, or an act of preference. Hatred is much more deeply rooted in our nature than 
all these phenomena. It is the condition that makes us closed to values, the deep move-
ment of the heart that is directed towards lower values and destroys higher ones. As a 
movement of the heart it has its own epistemic value. This does not consist in reacting 
to values, in grasping them or their rank, but in being closed to the higher values of its 
objects and in closing down its possibilities. It is an initiatory act or movement of the 
heart oriented towards the world. 
 It is necessary to observe that hatred as a movement of the heart towards lower pos-
sibilities of being is different from the mere phenomenon of value-blindness. Hatred 
implies a closing down of possibilities of its object, and in this sense it is blinding  for 
values but not blind  to them. 19 The phenomenon of value-blindness does not belong 
to the emotional act-experience, but to the function of feelings. It is a distortion of 
the feeling as function. Dietrich von Hildebrand differentiated three different pos-
sible forms of value-blindness as a preference for a lower over a higher value: total 
value-blindness (a person who does not understand the concepts of good and bad), 
partial value-blindness (a person who can understand some values but not others), 
and subsumption blindness (a person who can understand values but not the bearer 
of such values). 20 Given that we may hate something or someone whose value we 
recognize, the phenomenon of value-blindness should not be confl ated with hatred 
(although both phenomena might be related). 
 §1.2. Hatred’s narrow scope 
 A crucial second question concerns the world of objects of hatred. By developing 
some important features of the intentionality inherent to hatred introduced previously 
and showing its asymmetry in relation to love, an answer to this question may be 
attempted. 
 What are the objects of hatred? Hatred (and love) is directed towards objects that 
may be bearers of value. 21 These objects are not primary persons but value-bearers 
in general. 22 Persons insofar as they are bearers of value can be objects of love and 
hatred. 23 Thus, persons are possible objects of love and hatred, but they are not the 
only possible objects. Self-hate (and also self-love) is as primary as hate (and love) 
directed towards others. That said, Scheler elaborates a taxonomy of the forms, types, 
and modes of hatred (and love). He distinguishes three  forms of hatred (and love): 
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spiritual, psychological, and vital hatred (and love). Body, I, and person are the three 
bearers of such forms, which are correlated to three different kinds of values: vital, psy-
chological, and spiritual values. 24 According to the quality to which they are directed 
in their objects, it is also possible to distinguish  types of hatred (and love): hatred 
against a country, culture, etc. The  modes of hatred (and love) express the connection 
between hatred (and love) and social behaviors and experiences of malevolence, hostil-
ity, etc. Finally, Scheler distinguishes hatred (and love) from those affective phenomena 
of which these are part, such as envy or jealousy in the case of hatred. 
 Despite that in this book he elaborates a parallel analysis of hatred and love, Scheler 
is aware here as well as in his minor texts that regarding the world of their objects, 
they are not symmetric opposites. 25 The differences between the phenomena can be 
summarized in the following three claims. First, hatred is not just an absence of love. 
It is a positive act in which a disvalue is given, just as in love a positive value is given. 
Hatred cannot be explained just as being closed to values. It is open towards the low-
est values and aims for the annihilation of the highest. Thus, in this sense, hatred is a 
movement of the heart on its own and shows its specifi c way of being oriented towards 
the world. 
 Second, the scope of hatred is much narrower than the scope of love. The ways in 
which each of us is directed towards the world are manifold and varied, but the ways 
in which our nexus with others and ourselves is broken is much more confi ned. Schel-
er’s concept of an “order of love” as developed in his essay “Ordo Amoris” (1913) is 
revealing in this regard. There is, for each individual and collective, an “ordo amoris,” 
that is, “a system of value-assessments and value-preference.” 26 This system is the 
window through which the world is perceived, for which Scheler uses the Augustinian 
term “ordo amoris.” This “order to love” is the 
 means whereby we can discover, behind the initially confusing facts of man’s mor-
ally relevant actions, behind his expressions, his wishes, customs, needs and spir-
itual achievements, the simplest structure of the most fundamental goals of the 
goal-directed core of the person, the basic formula, so to speak, by which he exists 
and lives morally. 27 
 More than knowing and willing, it is the heart that characterizes the core of the human 
being, and the way in which it is directed towards the world, others, and itself, is 
characterized as openness. An “order to hate,” however, is not given, such that hatred 
appears only when this openness towards the world and this order to love is broken. 
 Related to this second difference is a third. Hatred implies love, but love does not 
imply hatred. According to Scheler – and this point is shared by all early phenome-
nologists – the heart is determined to love and not to hate. Thus, the phenomenon 
of hatred appears only when the positive nexus of the world is broken. Hatred as a 
movement towards closing down possibilities of the other and ourselves presupposes 
that it is fi rst able to see values in the other. 
 §1.3. Self-poisoning and destructive dynamics 
 The expression of hatred is characterized by its aim of annihilating the values and the 
object towards which it is directed. 28 Two extreme possibilities for this movement are 
examined by Scheler: on the one hand, the repression of its expression, which may lead 
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to the phenomenon known as “ressentiment” and, on the other hand, its more radical 
and destructive execution in war. 
 When the psychic energy of hatred does not fi nd an expression, it is sustained and 
repressed, such that it can intoxicate the inner life of individuals and collectives that 
facilitate the appearance of the emotional attitude of ressentiment. This happens, for 
example, when the subject of hatred is too weak to undertake destructive action or 
when there are social norms that forbid him from expressing it in an annihilating 
manner. This phenomenon was masterly analyzed by Scheler in his essay on ressenti-
ment. A fi rst version of the article appeared under the title “Über Ressentiment und 
moralisches Werturteil.” The extended version of the work – “Das Ressentiment im 
Aufbau der Moralen” – was fi nally published in 1915. At the individual level Schel-
er’s analysis offers a psychological explanation for the formation of ressentiment as 
a mental disposition. At the collective level, it develops a criticism of the main traits 
of modernity: moral subjectivism, egalitarianism, and the negation of high values, 
explaining how it creates an inversion of values in which the useful appears to be of 
more importance than the vital. 29 
 The term  ressentiment was introduced as “terminus technicus” by Nietzsche in elab-
orating his criticism of Christianity. Taking Nietzsche’s term as point of departure and 
criticizing his interpretation of Christianity, Scheler develops his own analysis of this 
phenomenon and the way in which it molds the character of individuals and collec-
tives. Ressentiment in this sense is a hostile affective attitude rooted in the depths of 
our heart, which implies self-poisoning and is related to other negative attitudes, sen-
timents, and emotions. As such it should be distinguished from “resentment,” which 
is an emotional displeasure arising from a sense of injury, seen as a “legitimate form 
of anger [in] responding to moral wrongs” that plays an important role in our social 
world. 30 
 In Scheler’s view, ressentiment is a disposition of the soul that has its origins in an 
impotence regarding expressing negative feelings such as revenge, hatred, malice, envy, 
rancor, and spite. The corrosive psychic energy of these negative feelings when they do 
not fi nd adequate expression and are sustained intoxicates individuals and collectives. 
As Scheler writes, ressentiment 
 is a lasting mental attitude, caused by the systematic repression of certain emo-
tions and affects which, as such are normal components of human nature. Their 
repression leads to the constant tendency to indulge in certain kinds of value delu-
sions and corresponding value judgments. 31 
 The result of the poisoning action of these hostile feelings is a self-defeating turn 
of mind. When the subject feels impotence regarding achieving her desired goals, a 
distorted apprehension of values and the value-hierarchy takes place. Essential to this 
phenomenon is a value-delusion, which consists of reducing and degrading genuine 
values as well as their bearers. The person of ressentiment then becomes gradually 
blind to those values and replaces them with illusory negative ones. In this sense, she 
has a disordered heart: an inversion of values has taken place. 
 In current terminology, ressentiment emerges in order to reduce the dissonance 
experienced between the desired situation and the actual situation. It should not, how-
ever, be confused with a similar phenomenon called “sour grapes.” The phenomenon 
of “sour grapes” – as Jon Elster has pointed out – is an adaptive mechanism for 
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reducing dissonance: “Sour grapes is the adaptation of preferences to what is seen as 
possible.” 32 In order to adapt to the given possibilities, we claim that the desired aims 
are not so worthy as they seemed in the beginning. In ressentiment, in contrast, there 
is a devaluation of the value of the thing we cannot achieve. In this case, there is no 
adaption to what is seen to be possible but a change of judgment regarding the value of 
the desired goals In contrast, as described by Scheler, the phenomenon of ressentiment 
is far more radical than the phenomenon of sour grapes: the person of ressentiment 
does not simply consider that the sweet grapes are sour but that sweetness itself is bad. 
Thus, in ressentiment we speak about an inversion of values. 
 It is also important to underscore that ressentiment is an affective disposition rather 
than an emotion. While revenge and envy are directed towards specifi c objects and 
are bodily felt in a singular way, ressentiment is an attitude; it might become a per-
sonality trait that affects the way in which we perceive the world and are directed 
towards it. This much deeper nature is a common trait shared by both ressentiment 
and hatred. In addition, both are blinding forces of the mind. There is, however, an 
important difference between ressentiment and hatred. While the fi rst presupposes a 
value-delusion, hatred does not necessarily imply the same. It is possible for the hater 
to be aware of the values of the hated object but still directed towards the realization 
of its lower values. The ressentiment-imbued person, on the contrary, is blind to those 
values he or she once desired to achieve. Scheler’s analysis shows that ressentiment can 
be contemplated as one possible consequence of hatred and its corrosive energy. When 
hatred is sustained, it may poison the soul and prepare the terrain for the emergence 
of ressentiment. Hatred fuels ressentiment. 
 A second, very different possibility inherent to hatred concerns how this affective 
attitude may lead to excessive violence and total destruction. War is hatred’s ultimate 
expression: it is the most extreme outbreak. In 1916, shortly after writing his essay 
on ressentiment, Scheler announced a conference on hatred that was published under 
the title “Die Ursachen des Deutschenhasses. Eine Nationalpädagogische Erörterung.” 
In this text he addresses some aspects of the phenomenon that had remained unex-
plored in his text on ressentiment. Here he observes that hatred may function as a 
dispositional background and adopt different manifestations. Focusing on the causes 
of the hatred against Germany, he elucidates its internal mechanisms that generate 
hostile and atrocious actions. The essay covers the question of whether the processes 
described in the essay on ressentiment are valid for all of Europe and considers the 
First World War as a case of hatred of the periphery against the center (understood 
not in a geographical but in a moral sense). 33 Hatred is depicted as a “toxic, corrosive, 
deadly wind” 34 and – as in his analysis of ressentiment – it is considered at the individ-
ual and the collective level. Thus, according to Scheler, the fi rst collective experience of 
humankind was an experience of hatred, a hatred directed against Germany. 35 
 How does hatred develop? 36 In order to explain how hatred is possible, Scheler fur-
ther elaborates some of his ideas about an “ordo amoris.” As mentioned previously, 
according to Scheler in his text “Ordo Amoris,” the heart, that is, the complex of 
preferences, interests, and order of discovery of what matters to us, reveals the world 
of values and is a counter-image of this world. There are, however, among individuals 
and collectives, differences in terms of what matters and what is preferable. These dif-
ferences mean that values – despite their objectivity – are not grasped by each of us in 
the same way, because each has her own peculiar “logic of the heart” responsible for 
grasping and preferring some values over others. Scheler calls these different ways of 
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being directed towards the world, which reveal our preferences, interests, and orders 
of discovery, “ethos.” Each individual and collective is thus characterized by its own 
ethos, that is, by its specifi c way of preferring some values over others. 37 Differences in 
ethos are the cause of misunderstandings and explain how it is possible for hatred to 
emerge. Each collective may judge another collective according to its own ethos and 
not according to an objective value-system that is above national forms of ethos. 
 Is war the cause of hatred, or is hatred the cause of war? In Scheler’s view, war is not 
the cause of hatred; neither is hatred the cause of war. Nevertheless, two observations 
should be made: hatred grounds the disposition to make war possible, and the phe-
nomenon of war may give hatred new impulses. These impulses can be summarized as 
follows. First, it is possible for hatred sustained in an initial moment to re-emerge later 
in a stronger form. The repressed affect then tends to express itself more strongly. The 
link between hatred and its expression, however, is very complex. Though in the initial 
moment the expression of hatred reinforces the affect, it is also likely that once it is 
expressed, the affect will diminish. 38 In consequence, action reduces hatred and impo-
tence increases it. 39 This claim is consonant with Scheler’s analyses of ressentiment: 
as we have seen, when a group of negative affects are sustained, their psychic energy 
intoxicates the inner life of the subject. In virtue of its destructive force, hatred then 
plays a crucial role in this self-poisoning. Second, it is possible that as a result of war, 
hatred will progressively affect more and more individuals, social classes, and groups. 
Finally, it is also possible that hatred will expand to include new content. War, then, is 
responsible for the world of the objects of hatred expanding. 
 §1.4. Self-control and self-criticism 
 It is in this last mentioned text that we also fi nd an answer to the fourth question 
guiding this chapter, namely how it is possible to overcome hatred. In “Die Ursachen,” 
Scheler considers four possible ways to wrongly react to or interpret hatred. Despite 
the fact that Scheler’s analysis focusses on World War I, the ways he mentions are 
inspiring when it comes to understanding our possible attitudes towards this strong 
passion. They may be summarized as follows: (1) one possibility consists of reciprocat-
ing hatred with hatred; (2) a second option consists of letting the others hate as long as 
they fear (“oderint dum metuant”); (3) it is also possible to be infected by the hatred of 
others; (4) fi nally, it is also possible to interpret hatred as based on a lack of knowledge 
about the hated object. In contrast to these wrong attitudes towards hatred, Scheler 
suggests self-control of one’s own affects and a sober self-critical attitude towards 
oneself. 40 Hence, a cultivation of attitudes may lead to overcoming hatred as the most 
destructive passion of humankind. 
 §2. Alexander Pfänder: hatred as a sentiment 
 §2.1. Hatred and its centrifugal stream 
 In his book  Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen (1913/16), Alexander Pfänder offers an 
illuminating approach to the affective phenomenon of the sentiments (a phenomenon 
for which he uses the old German term “ Gesinnung ”), whose paradigmatic cases are 
love and hate. Pfänder’s tribute to phenomenology has unfortunately not received yet 
the attention it deserves. For the purposes of this chapter, however, his analysis is 
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highly interesting, since it contains insightful observations on hatred. In the book, 
hatred is always analyzed in parity with love (in this respect, Pfänder stands in contrast 
to Scheler and Kolnai, who devoted part of their works to an analysis of hatred as 
phenomenon of its own). The elaboration of Pfänder’s idea of a specifi c intentionality 
for the class of the sentiments, in contrast to the feelings, will lead to a philosophical 
statement on the four aspects of hatred that guide this chapter. 
 I begin with the question of the place of hatred in Pfänder’s taxonomy of the affec-
tive life. Hatred, according to him, is a sentiment (“ Gesinnung ”). Sentiments, in his 
view, possess a  sui generis kind of intentionality that has to be differentiated from the 
intentionality of feelings. Not only love and hate, but also friendship and hostility and 
benevolence and malevolence are considered sentiments, and as such are differenti-
ated from the class of feelings of sadness, joy, disgust, or envy. In order to elucidate 
the intentionality characteristic of hatred, it is necessary to explain a key concept in 
Pfänder’s phenomenology of the affective life: the concept of “centrifugality.” In his 
view, the psychic life is dominated by two main tendencies: on the one hand, there is 
a “centrifugal” tendency, which consists in being directed towards the world; on the 
other hand, when we feel affected by something in the world, we experience a “cen-
tripetal” tendency. Intentionality, as the tendency characterizing the direction from 
a subject to an object, is centrifugal. Centrifugal acts can have a variegated group of 
objects: persons, animals, inanimate objects, and cultural phenomena. According to 
Pfänder, these objects are given to us in cognitive acts such as perceptions, judgments, 
or fantasies. 41 Sentiments are based on cognitions: loving, hating, and being friendly 
or hostile require that the object towards which these centrifugal streams of the mind 
are directed has been perceived, judged, or fantasized. In contrast to Scheler, who 
defended the primary structure of love and hatred in our being directed towards the 
world, Pfänder defends a form of cognitivism according to which love and hatred are 
founded in cognitions. 
 A further characteristic of the intentionality of the sentiments in Pfänder’s view 
concerns the way in which they are related to their objects. In contrast to perception, 
thought, attention, fantasy, or volition, which Pfänder considers “cold,” sentiments, 
feelings, and moods are “warm psychic acts.” 42 In my view, this metaphor expresses 
the degree of involvement of the subject. Despite their sharing this feature, warm 
psychic acts should be strictly distinguished from one another. On the basis of their 
“centrifugality,” i.e., their intentional relation to objects, sentiments form a different 
class from feelings. They stream from the subject to the object and bridge the gap 
between both poles, i.e., they are essentially connected to their objects. By contrast, in 
Pfänder’s view, feelings are mere states with no essential connection to their objects. 
In addition, whereas feelings oscillate between the poles of pleasure and pain, the 
polarity exhibited by sentiments cannot be explained in terms of hedonic valence. 
Love can be painful when, for instance, it is not reciprocated, and hatred can be expe-
rienced as pleasant. Happiness, however, is always felt as agreeable, while sorrow is 
always an unpleasant feeling. In this sense, sentiments resemble attitudes more than 
felt bodily states, while feelings are episodic bodily-bound states. Sentiments are also 
different from moods: moods are not centrifugal streams of the mind, and they are not 
object-directed. 43 
 These claims regarding the centrifugality of sentiments are revelatory for under-
standing the nature of hatred. Hatred exhibits a sui generis intentional relation to its 
objects: it is based on cognitions, it establishes a bridge between subject and object, 
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and it has the character of an attitude more than a bodily-bound feeling. In conso-
nance with Scheler, then, it seems that for Pfänder, hatred also occupies deeper levels 
of the self than mere feelings. 44 But, in contrast to Scheler, Pfänder defends the claim 
that hatred is founded in cognitive acts, whereas Scheler sees hatred as a spontaneous 
and founding movement of the heart. 45 
 §2.2. Object relation and mode of givenness 
 According to Pfänder, it is possible to elaborate a taxonomy of sentiments regarding 
their polar structure, their relation to objects, the mode of givenness, and the forms 
they can adopt. The analysis of the second and third of these criteria is illuminating 
when it comes to answering the second question motivating this chapter, about the 
objects of hatred. Regarding the criteria of the relation to objects, it is possible to dis-
tinguish three kinds of sentiments. By virtue of the relation between subject and object, 
sentiments can adopt three different forms. They may be superordinated, at the same 
level, or subordinated to their object. The hatred of the slave for her master or hatred 
of the nobility is subordinated, hatred among mates is at the same level, and hatred of 
a disabled person or of animals is a superordinated hatred. 46 
 As far as the mode of givenness is concerned, sentiments may be actual, virtual, or 
habitual. 47 Actual sentiments are accompanied by awareness, virtual sentiments are 
potential sentiments of which we may still be aware, and habitual sentiments can be 
felt regularly but we are not necessarily aware of them. These habitual sentiments also 
confi gure the actual and virtual kernel of our personality. 
 §2.3. Polarity: destructive quality, avoidance, and disapproval 
 Analysis of the criteria of polarity will help us develop an answer to the question of the 
expression of hatred. According to this trait, sentiments can be classifi ed as positive or 
negative in terms of three features. First of all, on the basis of their “intrinsic quality,” 
positive sentiments are “supporting” and “warming” and negative ones are “destruc-
tive” and “corrosive” regarding their objects. This intrinsic quality is not to be inter-
preted as a concomitant sensation that may appear to accompany the sentiment but 
as a kind of psychological quality resulting from their being intentionally directed 
towards their objects. Second, by virtue of an “act of position-taking” towards the 
intentional object, the subject can join or avoid contact with it. Love is a paradig-
matic case of joining with the object towards which one is directed, and hatred is the 
paradigmatic case of separation. Joining and separating are conceived in this account 
of affective intentionality as two possible intentional relations between subject and 
object. 48 Third, sentiments appear to be accompanied by an attitude of approval or 
disapproval. This attitude has to be interpreted as a form of affi rmation or disconfor-
mity with the existence of the object. While love affi rms and approves the existence of 
its objects, hatred negates and disapproves it. 
 According to these different criteria, hatred can be classifi ed as a negative senti-
ment that separates the subject from the object and is accompanied by an attitude of 
disapproval towards it. Despite this separation and disapproval, it is interesting that 
in hatred the intentional relation between subject and object is not nullifi ed. On the 
contrary, in the inner essence of this phenomenon there is a bridge between subject and 
object – a bridge that consists of rejecting the object while being intentionally directed 
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towards it. Here, again, we fi nd a feature of hatred already identifi ed by Scheler that 
will be crucial in Kolnai’s work: hatred is interested in its object, even though this 
interest has the aim of discovering in it further motives for its rejection. 
 It would be wrong to interpret this inner trait of hatred—the qualitative feeling of 
its corrosive energy—as a desire or a will to destroy its object. It is possible for a sen-
timent to appear together with a desire or an act of the will, but this is not always the 
case. The tendency to really or symbolically destroy its object is inherent in hatred, but 
this tendency to action does not always transform into a desire or an act of the will. 49 
Thus, although there is a motivational connection between sentiments and desires and 
volitions, this connection is not a necessary one. In Pfänder’s view—and this aspect 
is shared with Scheler—affective and conative phenomena may be strongly related to 
each other, but they should not be confl ated. 
 §2.4. Inauthentic sentiments and its transformative capacity 
 A fi nal question, which deserves special attention, concerns the possibility of cultivat-
ing the possibility of overcoming hatred. This idea may be explained using Pfänder’s 
claims about one of the forms that sentiments may adopt: inauthenticity. 50 The use of 
the term “inauthentic” describes those sentiments that arise in jokes, make-believe, 
and pretending to be moved by a sentiment. Inauthenticity is characterized by three 
features. First, a sentiment is inauthentic when it is prompted by the demands of the 
cultural and social environment. Such sentiments originally prompted and motivated 
in this way may not be in tune with other sentiments, desires, and thoughts of the 
subject, so that the sentiment has its origins “outside” the self, in the social world. 
A further feature of inauthentic sentiments – which plays a crucial role in explaining 
how hatred may be overcome – concerns their capacity to transform into authentic 
ones. An originally inauthentic sentiment may change into an authentic one when the 
subject changes his or her general attitude, and the sentiment that was at fi rst not in 
tune with the rest of the psychic life is now felt as spontaneously originating from the 
self. A third characteristic concerns their felt quality. In consonance with other phe-
nomenologists, Pfänder speaks about sentiments as having “the character of schematic 
imitations” of authentic sentiments. 51 
 The idea of an inauthentic sentiment that may transform into an authentic one 
when it is in tune with the rest of the psychic dispositions, thoughts, perceptions, and 
beliefs of the subject explains how a cultivation of sentiments is possible. This pos-
sibility highlights the social nature of our affects and a possible way of internalizing 
aspects of the social world. Thus, some of our more intimate sentiments in fact have 
a social nature. They are surrogates of authentic sentiments and may turn themselves 
into authentic ones when the general condition of the subject changes in a way that 
is favorable for them. Inauthentic sentiments lay the ground for authentic ones. And 
hatred may also be “cultivated” in this sense. When the environment suggests a senti-
ment of hatred against a specifi c person, group, community, cultural formation, etc., 
this hatred that at the beginning may be felt as inauthentic may commute into an 
authentic version, when the perceptions, beliefs, judgments, and convictions of the 
subject progressively change in a direction that supports that sentiment. 52 Together 
with this negative possibility of cultivating hatred, there is also the opposite possibil-
ity: such is the case when an authentic hatred converts into inauthentic hatred, which 
can be seen as a fi rst step in overcoming it. It is also possible for an inauthentic love to 
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transform into authentic love, such that it can be used as a counterforce against a given 
hatred. We might cultivate positive attitudes internalizing behaviors, for instance, imi-
tating the ways in which signifi cant others behave. 
 §3. Aurel Kolnai: hatred as a standard mode of aversion 
 §3.1. Hatred’s emotive response 
 A third philosophically revealing analysis of hatred in the framework of early phenom-
enology was delivered by Aurel Kolnai. The topic was fi rst treated in his “Versuch über 
den Hass,” a work published in 1935. This text is part of a trilogy on negative feelings 
that started with a study of disgust (“Der Ekel,” published in 1929) and pride (“Der 
Hochmut,” which appeared in 1931). Hatred is also a central topic of a later article 
entitled “The Standard Modes of Aversion,” published in the nineties but probably 
written at the end of the sixties in response to a request from David Wiggins to present 
to his seminar some of the ideas Kolnai had developed in his earlier article on disgust. 53 
 In  sensu stricto , Kolnai was not an early phenomenologist in the same sense that 
Scheler and Pfänder were. The Hungarian philosopher was not part of any of the phe-
nomenological circles of München, Göttingen, or Freiburg. In fact, he developed his 
work on the affective life at a time when the early phenomenologists no longer existed 
as a philosophical group. His work on the emotions, however, may be considered part 
of the early phenomenological corpus. At least three reasons support this claim. First, 
his approach echoes the main claims of early phenomenology. Kolnai inherited the early 
phenomenological view according to which emotions are characterized by an intentional 
directedness towards their objects and by a somatic reaction. He was chiefl y infl uenced 
by Scheler and Pfänder, as well as by Meinong’s philosophy of the emotions. 54 Second, 
Kolnai’s analyses are a fruitful application of the phenomenological methodology. To 
understand the nature of specifi c emotions, he undertakes an “eidetic variation,” distin-
guishing the phenomenon in question from similar phenomena. In this regard, Kolnai 
differentiates hatred from similar hostile attitudes, describing its essential traits, elabo-
rating its taxonomy, and analyzing it in great detail. This is precisely the modus operandi 
of early phenomenologists. Finally, Kolnai’s analyses of the emotions can be understood 
in the framework of phenomenological ethics, which saw in the affective realm a way 
to access the world of values. Thereby, despite the fact that for obvious spatio-temporal 
reasons Kolnai was not one of Husserl’s students, his work on the philosophy of affec-
tivity can only be fully understood in the framework of early phenomenology. 
 To begin with, what is the role of hatred in Kolnai’s philosophy of mind? Hatred is 
considered to be a “standard mode of aversion,” i.e., together with disgust and fear it 
is one of the hostile modes in which we may be directed towards the world. This idea 
can be clarifi ed in two steps. First, a preliminary refl ection on Kolnai’s view of the 
affective intentionality of the emotions is needed. As mentioned above, Kolnai shared 
the early phenomenological claim that emotions are chiefl y characterized by being 
intentional and bodily-bound. Kolnai, however, elaborates this claim in a peculiar 
way. Under the infl uence of Meinong, he describes affective phenomena as “emotive 
responses.” These are defi ned as follows: 
 something closely germane I think to Meinong’s  emotionale Präsentation , mean-
ing thereby acts or attitudes or conative states of consciousness which on the one 
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hand are clearly governed by an intentional object, and on the other hand express 
something like a passion aroused in the self, an impact exercised upon it down 
to its somatic sounding-board; in other words intention ( Gegenständlichkeit ) as 
linked essentially, though not in a uniform or unequivocal or causally necessary 
fashion, to condition ( Zuständlichkeit ). 55 
 Two important peculiarities of this claim have to be underscored. Emotive responses, 
in Kolnai’s sense, comprehend not only emotions but also acts, attitudes, and conative 
states. This brings Kolnai’s view closer to the Brentanian idea of a third class of mental 
acts – the class of love and hate – that comprehends all emotive (emotions, interests) 
and conative phenomena (volitions, desires) than to the early phenomenological thesis 
that separates the two types of mental phenomena. In addition, emotive responses are 
intentionally directed towards their objects: values and their bearers. Thus, they fulfi ll 
the cognitive function of grasping values, i.e., they are responsible for their disclosure. 
In this respect, Kolnai followed the later Meinong’s idea of an “emotional presenta-
tion,” i.e., the claim that emotions disclose values. 56 As far as this function is con-
cerned, we should note a crucial difference from Scheler. In Scheler’s model, only the 
“feeling functions” grasps values; not the emotions, which are conceived as responses 
to values grasped by the function of feeling. Kolnai’s claim about an epistemic achieve-
ment of the emotions is in line with the theses of other phenomenologists such as Edith 
Stein. 57 A similar claim can be found in current theories of the emotions. For instance, 
Mark Johnston claims that there is an “authority of affect” in expressing this strong 
cognitive function of the emotions, which consists in showing us what matters, while 
Christine Tappolet claims that emotions are perceptions of value. 58 
 Second, Kolnai’s view on the emotions sheds light on the use of the term “mode.” 
A mode is a peculiar form of directedness towards the world and of grasping informa-
tion about it. A look into the current philosophy of the emotions will also be helpful 
for understanding the complexity of this term. Aaron Ben-ze’ev recently claimed that 
emotions are mental modes: “An emotion is a general mode (or style) of the men-
tal system. A general mental mode includes various mental elements and expresses a 
dynamic functioning arrangement of the mental system.” 59 Modes are dynamic forms 
that express how the mental experience is organized. 60 As well as perceptual, imagi-
native, and intellectual modes, there are also emotional modes. Ben-ze’ev’s concept of 
emotions as mental modes is rich and complex and cannot be further elucidated here. 
Important for our understanding of Kolnai, however, is the idea that a mode expresses 
a specifi c dynamic of our mental system. In the case of the emotions, this dynamic 
presents what matters to us and involves us with the world in a different way from 
perceptions or judgments. Hatred, thus, as an emotive response is characterized by a 
peculiar way of being directed towards its objects and of being bodily felt (this peculiar 
way of being directed will be elucidated in the next sections). It shares basic traits with 
other negative modes of aversion, i.e., a common dynamic underlies them. 
 In Kolnai’s view, hatred possesses depth and centrality. 61 Taking Scheler’s claim 
regarding the stratifi cation of the affective life as a point of departure and developing 
it further, Kolnai also sees hatred as occupying the deeper layers of our personal struc-
ture. Thus, hatred involves the human being in a much stronger way than a sensation 
of displeasure, a mere dislike, or a discomfort. Affective phenomena, however, are 
not only rooted in different levels of the personality but also fi ll each one of the strata 
they occupy to a greater or lesser extent. In discussing this feature, Kolnai speaks of 
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“centrality.” A similar idea can be found in Scheler’s  Formalism , but there Scheler only 
briefl y refers to different meanings of the “depth” of the emotional life and leaves this 
idea unexplored. 62 It was Edith Stein who considered the feature of centrality – in her 
terms, the “reach” of feelings – to be independent of the feature of depth. 63 Hatred is 
central in the sense that it occupies the deepest layers of our personality to a maximal 
extent, i.e., its infl uence is not peripheral but affects and mobilizes signifi cant aspects 
of the human being. 
 §3.2. Existential bond and biographical character 
 Towards which objects is hatred directed? Hatred, in Kolnai’s view, is not merely a 
response to the quality of the “odious.” In this respect, it works differently from dis-
gust and fear, which are directed towards the qualities of the disgusting and the dan-
gerous, i.e., they disclose them. We feel hate towards what threatens and harms us and 
towards what we identify as evil, but hatred is neither a reaction to them nor discloses 
them. In tune with Scheler and Pfänder, in hatred Kolnai does not see a response to a 
perceived quality but a movement of the heart and a centrifugal stream of the mind 
that emanates from the subject towards its object, linking them in an essential way. 
The subject of hatred presents a strong interest in the hated object: it searches for its 
lower possibilities, and it is not interested in its improvement. 
 A remarkable trait of hatred concerns its historical character. Its objects are always 
dependent on the biography of the hating subject: between both there is an existential 
bond. It presupposes the experience of being personally affected by the presence of 
its object. In hatred there is a “ commitment to hostility,” as Kolnai claims. 64 It is the 
will of the subject of hatred to hate its object. This personal implication is not found 
in other modes of aversion that are mere responses to qualities and features of their 
objects. Hatred reveals much more of the hater than disgust or fear. 
 In contrast to the preceding analyses, for Kolnai hatred is always directed towards 
a person or a collective of persons or towards something expressive of the attitudes or 
words of this person or collective. 65 This claim differs, on the one hand, from Scheler’s 
claim according to which hatred is not always directed towards others – self-hate, 
in his view, is as authentic as hate directed towards others – and, on the other hand, 
from Pfänder, for whom possible objects of hate are not only human beings but also 
animals, plants, cultural formations, etc. 66 Hatred, in Kolnai’s view, refers to an indi-
vidual entity. 
 This bond between the subject and the object of hatred has important moral impli-
cations. As mentioned previously, hatred is directed towards what we identify as evil. 
Kolnai writes: 
 The intention of hatred is inquisitive, aggressive, propulsive. It impinges not only 
on the object as such but on its existential status in the world and thereby on the 
world itself, with an eye on its fi niteness: the world is, as it were, “too narrow a 
place to hold us both.” 67 
 In this regard, hatred reveals the depths of our moral system. Kolnai coins the expres-
sion “worldview of hatred” (“ Weltbild des Hasses ”) to express this point. 68 The char-
acterization of an object as “evil” is responsible for the subject’s wanting to annihilate 
or at least combat it. In consequence, the subject demands that the world in its totality 
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fi ght the hated object. Hatred implies a demonization of its object. Love, on the con-
trary, is radically different: it does not always imply reference to a good principle, such 
as God. 
 Regarding the world of its objects, a further aspect concerning the scope of hatred 
compared to love should be mentioned. Love and hatred are not, in Kolnai’s view, sym-
metrical opposites. Though love is a positive and hatred a negative attitude towards an 
object, the scope of these affective phenomena differs considerably. 69 The word  love 
embraces the entire conceptual fi eld of pro responses, while  hatred is confi ned to nar-
rower limits. Two arguments support this claim. First, there are more objects that can 
be loved than objects than can be hated. According to Kolnai, hatred is only directed 
towards persons and spiritual entities, but not towards objects. In addition, we may 
dislike an object, but this dislike does not lead us to hate it; pleasure and affi rmation, 
however, may lead to love more easily than dislike leads to hatred. Second, there are 
more forms of love than forms of hatred. There is  amor benevolentiae ,  concupiscen-
tiae ,  intellectualis , but none of these forms of love is possible in the inverse for hatred. 
Echoing a claim from Scheler, there is an order to love but not an “order to hate,” or 
an “ordo odii” is not possible. 70 Hatred can only appear punctually, where the posi-
tive nexus with the world is broken, but it never affects the entire web of life. After an 
examination of fear, disgust, and hatred, Kolnai claims, “Any project of attempting 
an analogous description of the modes of attraction would tempt us into describing 
life itself.” 71 The ways in which we may positively engage with others are much richer 
and more manifold than the ways in which we are involved in malfunctioning inter-
personal relationships. 
 §3.3. Destruction for its own sake 
 Like other aversive phenomena such as enmity, rejection, antipathy, disgust, and con-
tempt, hatred is also characterized by its negative tone. In the case of hatred, this is 
a destructive force that aims at the annihilation of its objects. This annihilation can 
also be symbolic, as we see in humiliation, insult, expulsion, etc. 72 Not all destructive 
intents, however, are motivated by hatred. In fear we may also aim to destroy the 
feared object in order to protect ourselves. What is characteristic of the destructive 
intention of hatred is that it is “for its own sake.” This univocal destructive intention 
of hatred stands in contrast – according to Kolnai – to the varied forms of positive 
intentions towards its object that are characteristic of love: proximity, dedication, 
union, improvement, etc. 
 §3.4. The habitus of love 
 Regarding the question of the possibilities of overcoming hatred, Kolnai’s refl ection on 
the intertwinement of love and hatred are illuminating. 73 This intertwinement may be 
interpreted in two ways: it is possible for both passions to be present at the same time 
and to be directed towards the same object (ambivalence), but it is also possible for 
both to be present as complementary attitudes. Regarding the possibility of ambiva-
lence, Kolnai recognizes the complexities of this phenomenon and tends to claim that 
it is not possible to simultaneously love and hate the same object. 
 A second and, for the purposes of this chapter, more interesting claim concerns the 
possibility of a habitus of love free of hatred, but not a habitus of hatred free of love. 
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This claim is directed against some psychoanalytic theories according to which in the 
roots of love we fi nd hatred. It is formulated in consonance with Scheler’s idea that 
love is a much more primary movement of the heart than hatred. The primacy of love 
over hatred points to possible ways of overcoming this passion. We can cultivate our 
love and try to reduce our hatred. The factual defeat of the adversary and putting him 
or her “hors de combat” may also be a possible way to overcome hatred. 
 Concluding remarks: hatred and its heuristic value 
 In conclusion, let’s return briefl y to the four questions that guided this chapter and 
whose answers have been sketched out by examining the concept of affective inten-
tionality in Scheler, Pfänder, and Kolnai’s works. What kind of phenomenon is hatred? 
The analyses of three early phenomenological responses to this question are not con-
clusive. Scheler considers hatred to be a movement of the heart, Pfänder thinks of it 
as a sentiment, and Kolnai as a mode of aversion. These three claims, however, do not 
have to be seen as competing. Each approach illuminates hatred from a different side 
and sheds light on a different facet. Common to all is the claim that hatred, when it 
appears, is deeply rooted in the core of the human being, bridging the gap between 
subject and object, and characterized by a search for disvalue in its object. Rather 
than an emotion, hatred has the character of an attitude towards the world. What 
is the world of its objects? Scheler and Pfänder consider the possibility that hatred is 
not only directed towards others but also to oneself, as well as towards non-personal 
beings. Kolnai, on the contrary, always supposes a personal entity as the object of 
this passion. Common to all is the claim that hatred is not just a mere response to a 
feature or quality of the object and that it has a biographical character. In addition, 
they consider the scope of hatred to be narrower than the scope of love. The corrosive 
force and deadly energy of this passion determines the different negative ways it may 
be expressed: annihilation, destruction, humiliation, extermination, and extinction in 
factual or symbolic terms. This aspect is shared by all three. 
 A morally perfect world would be a world free of hatred. We, however, live in a 
morally “imperfect” world in which the eradication of hatred can only be seen as a 
desideratum that is diffi cult, if not impossible, to achieve. Marguerite La Caze has 
suggested that negative emotions such as envy and resentment play a valuable moral 
role in leading us to recognize and act against injustice. Thus, she claims, “It is true 
that in a perfect world, there may be no envy or resentment, but in this world we 
need them. We probably do not need to cultivate these emotions, yet we should fi nd 
their absence disturbing.” 74 A modifi ed claim can be defended for the case of hatred. 
Hatred cannot lead us to recognize injustice or evil because hatred closes down pos-
sibilities: it is preoccupied with the lower possibilities of the hated object, it destroys 
interpersonal bonds with others and ourselves, and it tends towards the factual and 
symbolic annihilation of its object. 75 Hatred has value of a different kind: it can help us 
understand our human world and discover ugly and undesirable facets of the human 
being that we tend to overlook or disguise. Its heuristic value consists in showing us 
that, in our world, hatred is a possibility inherent to human nature. Its analysis reveals 
that it is possible to break the positive nexus with others and ourselves and move in 
the direction of lower values. It also shows that, like an antidote to hatred, the human 
heart has the means to overcome it. Hatred, then, is not like an illness that comes up 
suddenly. 76 It presupposes strong personal implications, and it has the character of a 
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personal choice. The three authors analyzed in this article reveal different aspects of 
this possibility: Scheler speaks of self-control and self-criticism, Pfänder of the cultiva-
tion of love, 77 and Kolnai of factual defeat of the hated object in order to overcome it. 
 The aim of this chapter was not only to offer a historical reconstruction of Scheler, 
Pfänder, and Kolnai’s claims about hatred but also to present their claims as a fruitful 
application of the phenomenological method towards an understanding of the human 
heart. I have not merely reported what early phenomenologists claimed about hatred; 
rather, I used some of their theses to elaborate a reasoned answer to four questions 
about the signifi cance of hatred as a human passion. I hope to have shown that early 
phenomenological refl ections, far from being obsolete, are highly relevant and lucid 
approaches worthy of debate even today. The studies undertaken in this chapter can 
be taken as inspirational points of departure for re-thinking this phenomenon and 
shaping future investigations into its nature. 
 Notes 
 1  Though a big part of the early phenomenological work in philosophy concerns their original 
investigations into the affective life, this group of thinkers did not only contribute to this 
fi eld. Their interests covered multiple topics, such as perception, knowledge, and conscious-
ness. For an overview of the different fi elds of interest of the early phenomenologists, see 
Parker and Moran (2015, pp. 11–24). 
 2  This anthropological claim can be found in Max Scheler and in those philosophers inspired 
by him (for example, Ortega y Gasset and von Hildebrand). Love is also a key concept for 
the understanding of the reception of Scheler´s philosophy in other countries. Cf. for the 
case of Spain and France: Ramos, A. P. (1993). Schelers Einfl uss auf das Denken der span-
ischsprachigen Welt,  Phänomenologische Forschungen 28/29: 314–331, and Leroux, H. 
(1993). Sur quelques aspects de la réception de Max Scheler en France,  Phänomenologische 
Forschungen 28/29: 332–356. Love was also an important topic of Husserl's late ethics. Cf. 
Melle, U. (2005). Edmund Husserl: From reason to love. In  Critical Assessments of Leading 
Philosophers , Volume V, eds. Rudolf Bernet, Don Welton and Gina Zavota, 119–139 (here 
128). London and New York: Routledge. Also: Walton, R. (2003). La razón y sus horizontes 
vitales en la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl.  Escritos de Filosofía 2(1): 245–269. 
 3  I take this expression from Durán (1956, p. 114), who used it for Scheler and Ortega y Gas-
set, and I use it to indicate all thinkers belonging to this movement. 
 4  Wundt, for instance, observed that we possess more names for negative emotions than for 
positive ones. I take this explanation for the disparity between the short list of positive 
emotions and the longer list of negative ones from Kolnai. This author dedicates his later 
text, “The Standard Modes of Aversion: Fear, Disgust, and Hatred,” to develop a thesis of 
asymmetry between the fundamental types of emotional responses to objects, offering a 
differential analysis of the three mentioned modes of aversion (Kolnai 2004, pp. 93–109). 
In a less elaborate form, a similar claim can also be found in Scheler, who was aware that 
positive attitudes (love) have a wider range of objects than negative ones (Scheler 1973a). 
 5  This is now changing. However, for many years  Forgiveness and Mercy , a book written by 
Murphy and Hampton and published in 1988, was the only account on hatred in contem-
porary philosophy 
 6  For a phenomenology of love and hatred based on Husserlian Phenomenology, see Hadreas 
(2007). Hadreas focuses on Husserl’s middle and late research manuscripts and recent schol-
arship on these (he also discusses some of Scheler’s claims). 
 7  Thomas Brudholm (2010, pp. 289–313) takes this question as a point of departure for 
his article on hatred and offers an analysis of hatred as retributive reactive attitude (using 
Strawson’s concept of “reactive attitudes”). 
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 8  For an overview of Scheler’s philosophy of feelings, see Henckmann (1998) and Mulligan 
(2008). 
 9  Scheler (1973b, p. 256). 
 10  Ibid., p. 261. 
 11  Ibid. 
 12  For a current version of this theory inspired in Scheler, see Mulligan (1998, pp. 89–105). 
 13  Brentano (1925). 
 14  Scheler (1973c, p. 150). 
 15  Ibid., p. 156. 
 16  Scheler (1973a, pp. 110–11). 
 17  Scheler (1973c, p. 157). 
 18  For a development of Scheler’s claims on love and its intertwining with the phenomenon of 
humility, see Steinbock (2014, pp. 223–60). 
 19  Here I follow Steinbock 2014, p. 226. 
 20  Von Hildebrand (1982, p. 44). 
 21  Scheler (1973c, p. 151). 
 22  Ibid., p. 154. 
 23  Ibid., p. 157. 
 24  Ibid., p. 170. 
 25  Ibid., p. 155. 
 26  Scheler (1973a, p. 98). 
 27  Ibid., p. 102. 
 28  For an analysis of the action tendency inherent to hate in the framework of current philoso-
phy of the emotions, see Elster (1999, pp. 194–5). 
 29  Scheler (1972, p. 149). 
 30  For an accurate differentiation of both phenomena, see Brudholm (2006, p. 12). 
 31  Scheler (1972, pp. 45–6). 
 32  Elster (2001, p. 110). 
 33  Scheler (1982, pp. 298, 300). 
 34  Ibid., p. 311. 
 35  Ibid., p. 286. 
 36  In what follows, I will focus on his analysis of hatred and leave aside his considerations 
about the particular case of hatred of Germany. 
 37  Scheler (1982, p. 343). 
 38  Ibid., p. 290. 
 39  Ibid., pp. 292–3. 
 40  Ibid., p. 371. 
 41  Pfänder (1913, p. 340). 
 42  Ibid., p. 362. 
 43  Ibid., p. 354. 
 44  Edith Stein (1989, p. 101) and Gerda Walther (1923, p. 60) established parallelisms between 
Scheler and Pfänder’s models of the stratifi cation of the affective life. 
 45  Phenomenologists were divided about the link between emotions, cognitions, and values. 
Scheler claimed that there is an original emotional intentionality through which values are 
given and that is founding for cognitions. Unlike him, Husserl, Stein, Pfänder, and Kolnai 
claimed that intentional feelings are founded and refer to objects that are given in founding 
objectifying acts (cognitions). Cf. Drummond, J. (2002). Introduction: The phenomenological 
tradition and moral philosophy. In  Phenomenological approaches to moral philosophy , eds. 
John J. Drummond and Lester Embree, 1–13 (here 9). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 46  Pfänder (1913, p. 379). 
 47  Ibid., p. 331. Developing Pfänder’s claims further, Walther (1923, p. 48) elaborated a classi-
fi cation of sentiments in actual, unconscious, potential, and habitual forms. 
15031-1793d-1pass-R02.indd   176 5/2/2018   8:38:43 PM
Phenomenological approaches to hatred 177
 48  The signifi cance of this act of position-taking in human sociality was analyzed and devel-
oped by Stein (2000) and Walther (1923). For an analysis of Walther’s reception of Pfänder, 
see Caminada (2014, pp. 195–212). 
 49  Pfänder (1913, p. 352). 
 50  A complete theory of inauthentic feelings can be found in two disciples of Pfänder, whose 
Ph.D. theses he was supervising: Else Voigtländer (1910), who wrote on the types of self-
feelings, and Willy Haas (1910), who wrote on inauthentic feelings. 
 51  Pfänder (1913, p. 383). Here Pfänder develops a claim that can also be found in the tradi-
tion of the Graz School. According to this claim, mental phenomena may adopt two forms: 
authentic and inauthentic. Cf. Meinong (1977, p. 112). 
 52  Pfänder (1913, p. 397). 
 53  David Wiggins affi rms that the essay was probably written in 1969–70 on his request (Wig-
gins 2004, p. 108). In the Kolnai Archives, box 8, folder 6, I found a letter from Kolnai to 
Wiggins written on November 20, 1968, in which Kolnai affi rms that the discussion was 
very useful to him: “I for once have certainly benefi ted from the discussion of the 14th, espe-
cially as regards the object-of-fear identifi cation problem and, not quite unconnected with 
that, hints towards the task about horror. It must be hoped that Disgust and Hatred will at 
least not be wholly dull.” This suggests that if the text was not presented in that seminar, 
there was at least a strong interest in the topic. See Vendrell Ferran (2013, p. 26). 
 54  For an overview of Kolnai’s approach to emotions, see Korsmeyer and Smith (2004, pp. 9–14). 
 55  Kolnai (2004, p. 94). 
 56  Meinong’s claim (1968, p. 114) can be found in his later work  Emotionale Präsentation 
(1917). It is important to underscore that Meinong´s earlier theories of value are closer to 
emotivism than value realism. 
 57  Stein (1989, pp. 98–9). 
 58  Johnston (2001, pp. 181–214); Tappolet (2000, pp. 8–9). 
 59  Ben-ze’ev (2013, p. 57). 
 60  According to Ben-ze’ev, the initial mental mode is perception (sensation and sense percep-
tion). The emotional mode, in his view, is the most complex and comprehensive of all and 
presupposes capacities that are constitutive of the other modes. 
 61  Kolnai (2007, p. 101). 
 62  Scheler (1973b, p. 328). 
 63  Stein (1989, p. 104). This feature is related, in Stein´s view, to the mood-components that 
may be constitutive parts of feelings. 
 64  Kolnai (2004, p. 106). 
 65  Ibid., p. 94. 
 66  Pfänder (1913, p. 13). 
 67  Kolnai (2004, p. 107). 
 68  Kolnai (2007, p. 132). 
 69  Ibid., p. 105. 
 70  Ibid., p. 119. 
 71  Kolnai (2004, p. 107). In a similar sense, see Kolnai (2007, p. 116). 
 72  Ibid., p. 105; Kolnai (2007, p. 105). 
 73  Taking Kolnai’s analysis as a point of departure, Dorschel (2004, pp. 299–311) tries to give 
an answer to the question of whether love is intertwined with hatred. 
 74  La Caze (2001, p. 44) reveals the moral value of envy and resentment, linking both to justice. 
 75  In this I follow Steinbock’s view on the morality of the emotions. Steinbock claims, “the 
moral tenor of the emotion can be weighed according to how it opens up or closes down the 
interpersonal nexus” (2014, p. 14). 
 76  For this claim, see Kolnai (2004). 
 77  A fruitful development of Scheler and Pfänder’s claims on love and hatred, but especially on 
love, can be found in the work of Ortega y Gasset (2004). 
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